EN 50742:2025: protecting connected machinery against corruption of data and software

Why EN 50742:2025 is a standard to be adopted immediately

The Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 has introduced a net change in the machine sector, modern machines are no longer just cinematics, guards, sensors and actuators. They are digital systems, often connected, up-to-date, configurable and integrated into plant networks. A machine can receive data from an MES, exchange information with a SCADA, be reached remotely for assistance, use an industrial modem, read recipes from a network, save logs on a server, communicate with a cloud or be configured via software tool.

In this context, safety can no longer be treated only with the classic logic of random failure. A sensor can fail, but also a control parameter of the same sensor can be changed. A PLC may have a hardware error, but a program can also be updated with an unauthorized version. A guard can be interlocked correctly, but the logic that interprets the signal can be altered. An axis can operate within a safe speed limit, but the limit can be changed if the configuration is not protected.

EN 50742:2025 is important because it seeks to turn this issue into a structured method. It does not require machinery manufacturers to become an IT department. Instead, it requires a documented assessment of interfaces, software, critical data, modifications, evidence, protection levels and information for use. This is precisely the type of bridge that has been missing between cybersecurity and machinery safety under EN ISO 12100.

The standard is still at the draft stage and must therefore be interpreted with care. Cybersecurity is already a significant issue, however, and manufacturers of machinery with remote access, online diagnostics, programmable PLCs, safety controllers, advanced HMIs, process recipes, vision systems, robots, smart drives or interfaces to external networks should begin addressing it now.

The Machinery Regulation and the protection against corruption

Machinery Directive 2006/42/EC was developed when industrial connectivity played a very different role. Conformity focused primarily on mechanical and electrical risk assessment, while cybersecurity was not expressed as a technical requirement for machine safety. As automation evolved, that approach became increasingly inadequate. Production lines, packaging machinery, pharmaceutical and food-processing equipment, robotics and materials-handling systems are now integrated into complex digital architectures.

Machinery Regulation (EU) 2023/1230 intervenes precisely on this point. Annex III contains the requirement 1.1.9, dedicated exclusively to protection against alteration, and also links the issue to the safety and reliability of the control systems of the requirement 1.2.1. The technical sense is very clear: the connection of a device, physical or remote, to the machine should not carry the machine in a dangerous condition; hardware, software and critical data for compliance with essential requirements must be identified, protected and traceable (asset).

EN 50742:2025 technical standard is part of this theme to be harmonised with the Machinery Regulation. It does not replace EN ISO 12100, it does not replace EN ISO 13849-1 or IEC 62061 for functional safety; rather, it builds a bridge: part of machine hazards, considers threats that can corrupt data and software and defines protection measures when such corruption can affect safety.

This is the real change: cybersecurity is not treated as an abstract requirement, but as protection of functional safety against accidental or intentional alteration. A manufacturer must now ask not only whether a circuit achieves the required Performance Level, but also whether the software, data, interfaces and configurations that support the safety function are protected against changes that could make it ineffective.

What does corruption mean in a car

In the common language, corruption may seem like a generic word, in the technical standard EN 50742:2025 instead assumes a precise technical meaning: an accidental, legitimate or illegitimate modification of machine data that can lead to a dangerous situation. The point is not only the intentional cyber attack. It is any significant alteration of software, parameters, configurations or critical data that can affect risk reduction.

Concrete examples are easy to imagine: modification of a safe speed threshold, loading of an incorrect software version, alteration of a safety parameter, unvaled update of firmware, change of HMI configuration that enables a dangerous function, manipulation of a recipe with impact on cinema, replacement of a module with different configuration, deletion of logs, connection of an uncontrolled maintenance tool, bypass of a guard etc.

Modern machines typically have many input ports; corruption can take place via Ethernet, Wi-Fi, USB, memory cards, card reader, remote access, field buses, connections to external systems, service tools, maintenance laptops, temporary devices or components installed permanently. Some vulnerabilities are obvious, others are considered trivial until they become the point through which a critical change passes.

This is why EN 50742:2025 insists on the interface concept. A physical port, an application protocol, a logical link, a temporary maintenance connection or communication to an external service can become relevant if they allow to influence a safety-related function. The evaluation must not stop at the electrical framework: it must follow the real path of the data and the command.

scope: machines, related products and partly completed machinery

EN 50742:2025 technical standard has been written for machines, related products and partly completed machinery when hardware, software or data can affect safety. The logic is consistent with the Machinery Regulation: not only does the finished product count, but also the components and systems that, once integrated, participate in the reduction of risk.

Hardware components that transmit signals or data, interfaces to remote devices, control systems, embedded software, safety application software, configurations, parameterizations, critical data and information that allow the machine to function in safe conditions.

All machine interfaces to external systems and services can become a critical point even if the external system, taken in itself is out of the machine field; the interface through which the machine exchanges data or commands must always be evaluated. It is a decisive aspect for machines integrated in complex lines, MES/SCADA systems, remote assistance or other types of external connection.

The technical standard should not be interpreted as requiring the same level of cyber protection for every machine. A simple, stand-alone machine with no connections, software or data capable of affecting safety functions will have a different profile from an automated line with remote access and parameterised safety PLCs. The method is intended to make the protective measures proportionate to the context and their potential impact on safety.

Safety and cybersecurity: two different themes with one result

The correct path always starts from the risk analysis according to EN ISO 12100. Prima the hazards of the machine are identified, the risks are estimated and the reduction measures are defined; only after it makes sense to assess which vulnerabilities or threats can corrupt those measures. If it is unclear what functions are related to security, cybersecurity remains generic and does not produce useful evidence for the CE marking. Reference

The technical standard introduces the concept of “security context”, i.e. the security context foreseen for the use of the machine. It's a part that doesn't have to be underestimated. A machine intended to work in a segregated network, without the Internet and with controlled physical access, does not have the same profile as a machine with always active modem, diagnostic cloud and remote service from third parties. The manufacturer must declare and document the conditions envisaged, not leave them implicit.

The “threat assessment” is flanked by the analysis according to EN ISO 12100 precisely to identify the threats relevant to the machine. This analysis must focus on the threats that can lead to hazardous situations: spoofing identity, manipulation of configurations, alteration of memory, deletion of evidence, escalation of privileges, denial of service with safety effect, connection to unforeseen networks, improper use of credentials, uncontrolled updates.

In practice, the builder should build a logical chain: machine danger, function or reduction measure, connected digital assets, interface or path of change, threat, vulnerability, consequence on safety, protection measure, verification evidence. This chain is the technical heart of the file.

The two routes of the project EN 50742:2025

One of the most useful aspects of the technical standard is its two application routes. Manufacturers can either follow the EN IEC 62443 series or use a more traditional machinery safety approach that integrates cybersecurity without building a complete IEC 62443 system from the ground up.

Approach A: direct method with SRSL

Approach A is intended for manufacturers that want to apply a machine-specific method without relying entirely on EN IEC 62443. Starting from the machinery risk assessment, it defines the safety context, evaluates threats, identifies relevant interfaces and determines the security levels associated with safety functions.

The central concept is the SRSL, Safety-Related Security Level. It is not a Performance Level and is not a SIL. It is a level of security protection connected to a function or measure of risk reduction. It is used to decide which minimum requirements apply in terms of authentication, authorization, integrity, authenticity, input validation, tampering protection and traceability.

Approach A is particularly relevant to manufacturers of special-purpose machinery, automated lines, packaging and food-processing machinery, and industrial systems where functional safety is already managed under EN ISO 13849-1 or IEC 62061 but cybersecurity has not yet been structured in accordance with IEC 62443. It supports a more robust technical file without turning every project into a complex cybersecurity certification exercise.

Approach B: integration with EN IEC 62443

The Approach B is designed for those who develop machines, systems or components in the context of EN IEC 62443. In series this case connects the issue of protection against corruption to process requirements and technical requirements already present in EN IEC 62443-4-1, EN IEC 62443-3-3 and EN IEC 62443-4-2.

The logic is useful especially for structured manufacturers, automation components manufacturers, system integrators with mature cyber processes and machines intended for high-demand contractual sectors: pharmaceutical, infrastructure, energy, large plants, multinationals, high-automation lines and contexts subject to very stringent customer requirements.

Applying IEC 62443 in a generic way is not enough. EN 50742:2025 requires security requirements to be linked to the machine functions that affect safety. The objective is not to prove that the product is cybersecure in an absolute sense, but to demonstrate that corruption of software, data or interfaces cannot degrade machine safety within the foreseeable scenario.

SRSL: Safety-Related Security Level applied to safety functions

The concept of SRSL deserves attention, because it will probably enter the technical language of the coming years. For any safety or measure of significant risk reduction, the designer must assess which level of protection is necessary against corruption. The level arises from the fact that not all functions require the same level of containment, not all interfaces have the same exposure and not all data have the same impact.

The SRSL parameter must be the result of an evaluation. To establish it, at least three elements are needed: impact on safety, exposure of the interface and potential for attack or modification. A same machine can have different functions with different levels. For example, an effectless diagnostic on the safety can be treated differently than a parameter that modifies a safe speed threshold.

The strength of the method is traceability. The technical file must be able to show why a function has been considered SRSL1, SRSL2 or SRSL3, what measures have been applied and how they have been verified. Without this document chain, the level remains only a statement.

Tracing log and traceability in the Machinery Regulation

The recording of evidence will be one of the most critical themes. The Machinery Regulation asks that the machine is able to collect evidence relating to legitimate interventions or illegitimates on hardware, software and configurations when these elements are relevant to compliance with essential requirements. EN 50742:2025 technical standard translates this principle into technical traceability requirements.

It is not about registering any event of the machine, the obligation is to collect the evidence of the interventions that can change or interrupt behaviour, status or operation of the machine when such changes concern software, data or configurations with impact on safety.

For a manufacturer it means reasoning on four aspects: what events are to be traced, where they are kept, how long they remain available and how they are protected against unauthorized tampering or deletion; the format must be readable or at least documented and always available.

The theme of five years is particularly relevant, the traceability of software versions and safety-related interventions must be designed before, not added later. If the system does not have sufficient memory, if the logs are overwritten too soon, if there is no export procedure or if the cancellation is not controlled, the manufacturer will have difficulty to demonstrate compliance in case of request of the authority or post-installation dispute.

Technical Paper and instructions for use

The machine’s technical file will need to include the analysis carried out in accordance with EN 50742:2025. The logical framework proposed by the technical standard is shown below.

As seen from the workflow, the instructions for use must be consistent with the file. If the evaluation assumes that the machine is connected only to a trusted network, this condition must be indicated. If remote access is permitted only through authorized procedure, it should be described. If some changes are prohibited, the ban must be clear. If the user has to manage passwords, backups or updates, he must receive sufficient technical instructions.

This is not just about the user, it means to correctly distinguish what is embedded in the machine from what depends on the context of installation and use. A machine designed for a segregated network should not be sold with vague instructions that allow any connection. Design assumptions must become conditions of use.

Report with CRA, NIS2, RED and AI Act

EN 50742:2025 is being developed with a view to future harmonisation under the Machinery Regulation. It forms part of a broader European framework in which digital product security, cyber resilience and machinery safety are converging:

• The Cyber Resilience Act covers products with digital elements and introduces cybersecurity requirements along the lifecycle.
• NIS2 concerns the resilience of organizations and supply chains in important or essential sectors.
• The RED can become relevant for radio, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, LTE/5G and integrated radio devices.
• The AI Act comes into play if the machine incorporates artificial intelligence systems in regulated areas, especially when connected to safety.

This framework will make customer requests more frequent on bill of materials software, vulnerabilities, remote access, patches, logging, version management, network segregation and update procedures. The manufacturer who has already integrated EN 50742:2025 into its own risk analysis method will be more credible also in trade negotiations and technical audits.

Possible errors of manufacturers

• Say that cybersecurity is a customer problem user and not machine product.
• Consider only the Ethernet network and forget about USB, service laptops, memory cards, HMI, local access and programming tools.
• Declare an isolated machine without considering maintenance, testing, updates and remote assistance.
• Do not distinguish productive data from critical data for safety.
• Leave shared credentials, standard passwords or too large HMI roles.
• Allow the modification of safety-related parameters without permission, logs or integrity verification.
• Do not record interventions on software, configurations or versions relevant to safety.
• Do not protect logs from deletion or manipulation.
• Apply cryptographic measurements without checking its impact on response times and safety function behaviour.
• Write generic phrases in the instructions for use as "connect only to secure networks" without defining the expected safety context.
• Do not store evidence in the technical file: interface maps, threat assessment, SRSL criteria, tests, procedures, logs and versions.
• Treat IEC 62443 as a generic certificate without connecting it to the machine's safety functions.

How Waves Engineering supports manufacturers

Waves Engineering supports manufacturers in integrating protection against corruption into machine safety. The work starts from the risk analysis EN ISO 12100 and arrives at the technical file: interface map, safety-related asset identification, threat assessment, SRSL assessment, technical measurements verification, coherence with EN ISO 13849-1, instructions for use and documentation for CE marking.

The goal is to make it possible to demonstrate that the machine has been designed considering the risks of software alteration, data and configurations when they can affect safety. This approach reduces disputes, improves the quality of the technical file and prepares the manufacturer for the application of Machinery Regulation (EU) 2023/1230.

FAQ

What is EN 50742:2025?

EN 50742:2025 is a European technical standard on the machinery safety dedicated to protection against corruption. It involves accidental or intentional alterations of software, data, configurations, interfaces and components when they can generate hazardous situations or degrade safety functions.

is EN 50742:2025 already mandatory?

No. At the moment it must be treated as a technical standard and not as a definitive standard. However, the theme is already relevant because it comes from the requirements of Machinery Regulation (EU) 2023/1230. After any publication and citation in the Official Journal of the EU, the standard will become a very important reference for the presumption of conformity within the limits of its scope.

What is the difference between EN 50742:2025 and IEC 62443?

IEC 62443 is a series of standards for the cybersecurity of industrial automation and control systems. EN 50742:2025 focuses on machinery safety and protection against corruption when changes to data or software could have safety consequences. The draft also provides a route for applying IEC 62443 consistently with machinery safety functions.

Is the standard only about machines connected to the Internet?

No. Internet is just one of the scenarios. Local networks, USB ports, SD cards, maintenance tools, service laptops, HMI, field buses, RFID, temporary access and connections to external systems can also be relevant. It counts the possibility of affecting software, data or parameters related to safety.

What does SRSL mean?

SRSL means Safety-Related Security Level. It is a level of security protection connected to a function or measure of risk reduction. It is used to decide which requirements to apply to protect that function from data corruption, software, configurations or communications.

EN 50742:2025 replaces EN ISO 12100 or EN ISO 13849-1?

No. EN ISO 12100 remains the reference for the analysis of machinery risks. EN ISO 13849-1 remains the reference for parts of safety-related control systems when applicable. EN 50742:2025 adds to these references to treat corruption threats that can degrade safety.

What's to change in the technical file?

More robust evidence must appear on interfaces, software, critical data, threats, security context, logs, versions, updates, access and integrity measures. The file must demonstrate the link between machine risk and protection against corruption, not limit itself to a generic phrase on cybersecurity.

Does it also apply to machines already installed?

The project indicates an application to machines with respect to its date of publication and should not be read as an automatic retroactive obligation. However, for changes, revamping, software updates, remote access or new integrations, the theme can become relevant in technical and contractual evaluation.